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[Auto-Reply] I’m Driving—I’ll Get Back to 
You Later: Why New York Should Recognize 
Texters as Co-creators of Risk 
COURTNEY A. WAY† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a driver who causes a fender bender because he 
was texting with a friend and failed to pay attention when 
approaching a stop light. Of course, it seems implausible to 
sue the friend who was texting with the driver who caused 
the accident. Now, imagine a driver fighting with a friend 
rapidly over text messaging finally replying, “can’t talk, we 
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thank you to my husband, parents, and sister for listening to me talk 
about this Comment endlessly and supporting me through draft after 
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will continue this later. I am driving home now.” The friend 
continues to text the driver, causing his phone to ring and 
vibrate constantly on his drive home. While looking down to 
see the twenty or more missed text messages from his friend, 
the driver crosses the centerline and hits an oncoming 
vehicle. The passengers of the oncoming car are killed. In 
this scenario, the estate of the deceased may desire to sue the 
friend who continued to text the driver after the driver made 
the texter aware that he was driving and would settle the 
argument later.1 
Imposing duty on a third-party texter, more frequently 
referred to as sender liability, is a new development in the 
realm of tort law.2 Evolving from liability assessed in 
distracted driving accidents, sender liability seeks to impose 
a duty on third parties who are not in the vehicle, but who 
text a driver, where such texts distract the driver and result 
in the driver causing an accident.3 Presently, New York 
courts have not recognized sender liability, nor has the 
legislature addressed this growing threat to the welfare and 
safety of innocent individuals on the roads.4 The law 
currently responds to one part of the equation here: the 
driver. But what about the sender? The sender of a text 
message who has actual knowledge the recipient is driving 
and will likely respond to the text message actively engages 
 
 1 See, e.g., Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2013) (“[W]hen a texter knows or has special reason to know that the intended 
recipient is driving and is likely to read the text message while driving, the texter 
has a duty to users of the public roads to refrain from sending the driver a text 
at that time.”); Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 271 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (considering 
the applicability of sender liability in New York); see generally Gallatin v. 
Gargiulo, No. 10401 of 2015, C.A., 2016 WL 8715650 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 10, 
2016) (considering applying sender liability in Pennsylvania). 
 2. See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1229 (establishing the theory of sender liability). 
 3. Id. at 1228 (“When the sender texts a person who is then driving, knowing 
that the driver will immediately view the text, the sender has disregarded the 
attendant and foreseeable risk of harm to the public.”). 
 4. See Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 271 (refusing to adopt sender liability in New 
York). For a discussion of New York’s consideration of the adoption of sender 
liability, see infra Parts III, VI. 
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in affirmative conduct that co-creates the risk to innocent 
individuals on the road. Imposing duty on a party who co-
creates risk is not a revolutionary expansion of duty and 
therefore, the New York courts and legislature should not 
approach this issue reluctantly. 
This Comment highlights the growing safety risk of 
texting while driving, explores the development of sender 
liability, explains how New York courts could recognize such 
liability without expanding duty, and considers how New 
York State legislation should address this prevalent gap in 
its tort law. Part II introduces landmark case law that has 
recognized sender liability and the effects of such case law on 
subsequent legislation. Part III examines the trivial 
opportunity New York courts have had to address sender 
liability and suggests how the courts may recognize sender 
liability in the future without expanding traditional duty 
concepts. Part IV discusses the general concept of sender 
liability and how it relates to other types of third-party duty, 
suggesting sender liability is not a revolutionary expansion 
of the customary concepts of duty. Part V defines and 
explains New York State Dram Shop law while considering 
how it relates to sender liability and the possibility for 
legislation in this developing area of tort law. Part VI 
proposes considerations for New York legislation recognizing 
sender liability and Part VII concludes this Comment by 
discussing the ability of the courts to recognize sender 
liability and discusses whether the New York State 
legislature should proactively address sender liability. 
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II. TEXTING WHILE DRIVING: AN EPIDEMIC IN NEED OF 
JUDICIAL ATTENTION 
While tort law certainly imposes liability on the texting 
driver and most states have boosted penalties and fines 
associated with texting while driving,5 there is another 
instigator, a co-creator of the risk, who often escapes liability. 
Distracted driving is an epidemic that kills more than 3,000 
people and injures almost 400,000 people per year.6 Texting 
while driving contributes to a significant portion of these 
deaths and injuries.7 The penalties and fines currently in 
place have not reduced the incidents of texting while driving 
nearly as much as originally intended, thus necessitating the 
need for more stringent laws and recognition of the senders 
of text messages as co-creators of risk.8 
 
 5. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1225(c) (McKinney 2013). 
 6. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DISTRACTED DRIVING 2015 (last 
updated Mar. 2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/ 
812_381_distracteddriving2015.pdf (citing that in 2015, there were 3,477 people 
killed and an estimated additional 391,000 injured in crashes involving 
distracted drivers). 
 7. See Sam Ogozalek, With Distracted Driving Cases on the Rise, DA Takes 
‘It up a Notch,’ BUFFALO NEWS (July 20, 2018), https://buffalonews.com/2018/07/ 
20/tragic-distracted-driver-case-prompted-da-to-take-it-up-a-notch-when-filing-
charge/ (noting the tragic distracted driving accidents in Western New York 
including the death of a four-year-old boy when his father was texting and 
slammed into the back of a tractor trailer, the death of a sixteen-year-old 
pedestrian who was struck and killed by a driver who was texting, the death of a 
thirty-three-year-old mother of two who was killed when a distracted driver hit 
her disabled vehicle on the Thruway, and the death of a University at Buffalo 
nursing professor when a driver filling out a video game survey struck and killed 
her); Phil LeBeau, Texting and Driving Worse than Drinking and Driving, 
CNBC.com (June 25, 2009, updated Aug. 3, 2010), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
id/31545004 (concluding that reaction times are up to four times slower when 
checking an e-mail or text message on your phone while driving than drivers who 
drive undistracted).   
 8. See generally Anne T. McCartt et al., Symposium, Driver Cellphone and 
Texting Bans in the United States: Evidence of Effectiveness, 58 ANNALS 
ADVANCES AUTOMOTIVE MED. 99–114 (2014); Steve Hughes, Texting tickets more 
than double in New York but drivers are more likely to get a plea deal, TIMES 
UNION (Apr. 18, 2018, 12:01 PM), https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Cell-
phone-tickets-more-than-double-in-New-York-12828177.php (concluding many 
New York courts reduce texting while driving tickets, resulting in less points, 
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The theory of sender liability is limited and specific.9 It 
requires that the texter “knows or has special reason to 
know” that the recipient of the message is driving and that 
the driver is “likely to read the text message while driving.”10 
This foreseeability requirement results in the texter having 
a duty to users of the road and, therefore, the texter should 
refrain from texting the driver at that time, as it may result 
in an accident.11 This is not a novel theory, as it is rooted in 
widely accepted concepts of common-law third-party duty, 
such as social host duty, distracted driver liability, and 
passenger liability.12 
A. Kubert v. Best: The Groundbreaking Sender Liability 
Case 
While exchanging text messages with a friend, a driver 
of a pick-up truck collided with a couple on a motorcycle, 
resulting in both individuals losing their left legs.13 The 
Kuberts filed a lawsuit against Best, the driver of the pick-
up truck, as well as Best’s seventeen-year-old friend who was 
texting Best immediately prior to the accident.14 An issue of 
 
lower fines, and ultimately, less compliance with the law). 
 9. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Michaela Cronin, Call Me, Beep Me, if Ya Wanna Reach Me—Unless I 
Might Be Driving: An Analysis of Sender Liability and Why Pennsylvania Should 
Not Hold Citizens Responsible for Car Accidents Caused by the Drivers They Text, 
63 VILL. L. REV. 321, 336–37 (2018) (“In Pennsylvania, while no duty is generally 
owed by passengers, ‘[a] passenger may owe a duty to protect a third person from 
negligent acts of the driver where there is a “special relationship, joint enterprise, 
joint venture, or a right to control the vehicle.”’” (quoting DALE G. LARRIMORE, 
ESQ., WEST’S PA. PRAC., § 8:15 (2016–17 ed. 2016))); Denise Jones Lord, Beyond 
Social Host Liability: Accomplice Liability, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 553, 564–65 (1989) 
(asserting that the situation in Kubert is similar to social host liability because 
in the context of social host liability, the social host is not present at the time of 
the incident, just like the texter in Kubert was not present at the time of the 
accident). 
 13. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1219. 
 14. Id. at 1214. 
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first impression in New Jersey, the Superior Court, 
Appellate Division considered on appeal whether a third 
party who is texting a driver from a remote location can be 
liable to injured parties because the text messaging 
distracted the driver.15 
Discovery during the trial revealed that Best and his 
friend, Colonna, exchanged sixty-two text messages on the 
day of the accident, including the messages that Best and 
Colonna sent immediately prior to the accident.16 Consistent 
with other state court decisions, the court held that a party 
may not be liable for sending a text message merely because 
a driver might use his phone unlawfully, as to become 
distracted while driving.17 The court also held that a court 
may not impose liability where an individual who knows that 
the recipient of his text message is driving directs a text 
message to that specific recipient.18 The court then turned to 
the question of the sender having “special knowledge.”19 
As the first court to acknowledge the possibility of sender 
liability, the Kubert court did so carefully and strategically, 
requiring that “additional proofs are necessary to establish 
the sender’s liability.”20 In order to find sender liability, the 
 
 15. Id. at 1215. 
 16. Id. at 1219 (noting that the parties “averaged almost fourteen texts per 
hour for the four-and-a-half-hour, non-consecutive time-span they were in 
telephone contact on the day of the accident.”). Phone records revealed that only 
seventeen seconds passed between Best sending a message to Colonna and the 
time he called 911. During those seventeen seconds, Best hit the Kuberts, stopped 
his vehicle, exited his vehicle, observed the Kuberts’ injuries, and dialed 911. 
Therefore, the court inferred that the text message was sent almost 
simultaneously with Best colliding with the Kuberts. The court held that the 
distraction caused by texting while driving played a significant role in the 
collision. 
 17. This was a case of first impression, and therefore the court considered 
precedent cases of distracted driving generally, namely, cases where parties sued 
technology manufacturers for negligent design of a device or software. Id. at 1226. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
2020] TEXTERS AS CO-CREATORS OF RISK 715 
court required proof that the sender “knew or had special 
reason to know that the driver would read the message while 
driving and would thus be distracted from attending to the 
road and the operation of the vehicle.”21 Relating sender 
liability to passenger liability, the court held that a 
passenger could be liable even if that passenger did not 
actually obstruct the driver’s view, but demanded that the 
driver advert his eyes from the road to look at a distracting 
object.22 This hypothetical would lead the court to find 
liability because the passenger knew or had special reason to 
know that his actions would distract the driver.23 The same 
ideology applies to senders of text messages who know or 
have a special reason to know that the driver will be 
distracted by the notifications from his phone.24 Concerned 
with public policy, the court analogized texting and driving 
with drinking and driving, concluding that because the harm 
posed to others on the road is significant, there must be 
liability for all parties involved, as the law recognizes in 
drinking and driving cases.25 
 
 21. Id. (establishing sender liability by examining analogous circumstances 
and applying a “full duty analysis” as discussed in Estate of Desir ex. rel. 
Estiverne v. Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247, 1249 (N.J. 2013)). Vertus’ “full duty analysis” 
required evaluation of four factors: (1) the relationship of the parties, (2) the 
nature of the risk, (3) the ability to exercise care, and (4) public policy 
considerations. 69 A.3d at 1255. Vertus, a premises liability case decided by the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, held that “a premises owner owes a duty of care 
to one injured off premises if the source of the injury is a dangerous condition on 
the premises and if the injury is the result of a foreseeable risk to an identifiable 
person.” Id. at 1248. In its opinion, however, the court noted that this expansive 
view of the duty of care is not applied simply because the injury is foreseeable, 
rather, that a party negligently created a dangerous situation under the four 
established factors. Id. at 1249.  
 22. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. at 1228 (“When the sender texts a person who is then driving, 
knowing that the driver will immediately view the text, the sender has 
disregarded the attendant and foreseeable risk of harm to the public. The risk is 
substantial, as evidenced by the dire consequences in this and similar cases 
where texting drivers have caused severe injuries or death.”). 
 25. Id. at 1229. 
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B. Post Kubert v. Best 
Kubert articulated a new duty of care by holding that the 
sender of a text message owes a limited duty to the public 
when the sender “has actual knowledge or special reason to 
know from prior texting experience or otherwise,” that the 
recipient will view the text while driving.26 In response to the 
texting and driving epidemic, New Jersey enacted additional 
legislation in hopes of deterring texting while driving.27 
“Kulesh, Kubert & Bolis’ Law” adds to New Jersey’s 
vehicular homicide statute to include an inference of reckless 
driving if the driver was using a phone at the time of the 
accident.28 This amendment to the statute is in addition to 
the statutory ban on texting while driving.29 
In her article, Don’t Text a Driver: Civil Liability of 
Remote Third-Party Texters After Kubert v. Best, Emily 
Strider discusses the expansion of common-law negligence 
principles to cover third parties in social host liability 
contexts.30 Describing how these additions to New Jersey 
statutes play out in trial, Strider notes, “[t]he key element in 
both the vehicular homicide and assault by auto statutes is 
the reckless driving of the vehicle.”31 The addition of the 
inference of recklessness in cases where a driver was using a 
phone increases the likelihood of conviction in vehicular 
homicide and assault by auto cases because evidence of 
texting immediately proves recklessness.32 The legislature of 
 
 26. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 27. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5(a) (West 2012). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Emily K. Strider, Don’t Text a Driver: Civil Liability of Remote Third-
Party Texters After Kubert v. Best, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1003, 1014–16 (2015). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. (discussing New Jersey’s inclusion of the inference of recklessness 
when a driver is using a phone has also been added to New Jersey’s assault by 
auto statute, which addresses incidents where reckless driving results in bodily 
injury to another). 
 32. Id. at 1008–09 (“Although such an inference is not binding on the jury, the 
jury may rely on the inference alone to find that the defendant was driving 
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forty-seven states, Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, Guam, 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands have banned text messaging for 
all drivers, and some of these jurisdictions have also 
increased the penalties and fines associated with distracted 
driving and the resulting accidents.33 Despite other states 
recognizing the texting and driving epidemic, none have 
enacted legislation as strict as the state of New Jersey, nor 




 33. Distracted Driving, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, https://www. 
ghsa.org/state-laws/issues/Distracted-Driving (last visited Nov. 26, 2019). 
 34. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013); 
Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 265 (Sup. Ct. 2017). 
718 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
III. VEGA V. CRANE: A FIRST IMPRESSION SENDER LIABILITY 
CASE IN NEW YORK STATE 
A car accident occurring on a dark and rainy evening in 
Genesee County, New York set the scene for New York to 
address sender liability in the New York Supreme Court first 
impression case of Vega v. Crane.35 The accident occurred 
when the decedent’s vehicle crossed the centerline and 
struck Vega’s vehicle head-on.36 Upon investigation, the New 
York State Police concluded that the decedent was likely 
distracted, having found a cell phone located between the 
decedent’s legs after inspection of his vehicle.37 Further 
investigation revealed that the decedent and a friend, 
Cratsley, were texting before the accident occurred.38 During 
her deposition, Cratsley admitted to texting the decedent on 
the day of the accident; however, she indicated that she was 
unaware that the decedent was driving at the time that they 
were texting.39 
Vega argued that the court should follow in the steps of 
Kubert, while Cratsley cited to precedent New York case law 
that refused to impose liability on individuals who did not 
have control over third parties.40 The court, hesitant to 
 
 35. Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 265. 
 36. Id. 
 37. New York State Police concluded that the decedent was likely distracted 
because the scene lacked any signs that the decedent attempted to avoid colliding 
with Vega’s vehicle. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Upon investigation it was determined that none of the text messages 
between the decedent and Cratsley contradicted Cratsley’s statements. Id. 
 40. Vega further relied on Sartori v. Gregoire, 688 N.Y.S.2d 295 (App. Div. 
1999) for the proposition that a passenger may be liable for distracting a driver 
immediately prior to an accident. She also cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 303 (AM. LAW INST. 1965), which provides, “[a]n act is negligent if the actor 
intends it to affect, or realizes or should realize that it is likely to affect, the 
conduct of . . . a third person . . . in such a manner as to create an unreasonable 
risk of harm to the other.” Cratsley reasoned that the court should follow New 
York precedent such as Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1021–22 (N.Y. 1976), 
holding that liability will not be imposed on an individual who lacks control over 
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deviate from New York’s long-standing adherence to 
negligence law first set forth in Palsgraf v. Long Island 
Railroad,41 refused to adopt the new duty created by 
Kubert.42 In its opinion, the court conceded that the New 
York State Court of Appeals has gradually expanded the 
duty of care, but declined to do so in this case by limiting 
those holdings to each case’s unique fact pattern.43 
New York courts have historically refused to broaden the 
scope of negligence. In some rare cases, they have slightly 
broadened the scope, but only did so reluctantly.44 One of 
those rare cases is Davis v. South Nassau Communities 
Hospital.45 In Davis, the New York State Court of Appeals 
expanded the duty of care to third-party medical 
professionals and hospitals.46 In its holding, the court 
 
the third party. Id. 
 41. See generally 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 42. Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 268 (discussing the court’s strict adherence to the 
doctrine of negligence first debuted in Palsgraf. The court notes that Palsgraf 
held that no duty of care is owed to a third party if the injury is not reasonably 
foreseeable and asserts that if it chose to adopt the new duty created by Kubert, 
it would be broadening the Palsgraf scope of duty). 
 43. Id. at 270. 
 44. Id. at 267. 
 45. 46 N.E.3d 614 (N.Y. 2015). 
 46. Id. at 624 (holding that despite the holding in Purdy v. Public Adm’r of 
County of Westchester, 526 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1988) courts have imposed a duty of 
care where there exists a special relationship between the parties). In Davis, the 
hospital gave a patient a controlled substance and then discharged her. Shortly 
after the administration of the medication and her discharge, the patient crashed 
her vehicle into a bus operated by the plaintiff, injuring him. Id. at 617. The court 
reasoned that the patient was not properly educated regarding the medication 
she was prescribed and how it would affect her ability to operate a vehicle. Id. at 
623. Therefore, the court held that the medical professionals and hospital, as 
third parties, had a “special relationship” with the plaintiff and therefore imposed 
a duty. Id. at 622. In its analysis the court reasoned: 
[O]ur calculus is such that we assign the responsibility of care to the 
person or entity that can most effectively fulfill that obligation at the 
lowest cost. It is against that backdrop that we conclude that, under the 
facts alleged, defendants owed plaintiffs a duty to warn Walsh that the 
medication defendants administered to Walsh impaired her ability to 
safely operate a motor vehicle. 
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reasoned, “[a] critical consideration in determining whether 
a duty exists is whether ‘the defendant’s relationship with 
either the tortfeasor or the plaintiff places the defendant in 
the best position to protect against the risk of harm.’”47 
However, as illustrated by Vega, New York courts are 
cautious in expanding duty to third parties and in cases such 
as this, prefer to defer to the legislature to determine what 
is actionable.48 
There is no reason for Vega to be the last word on sender 
liability in New York. When it comes to recognizing texters 
as co-creators of risk, it should not matter that New York 
courts have historically refused to broaden the scope of duty. 
Recognizing sender liability is not in any way a revolutionary 
expansion of duty. A texter is a co-creator of risk just like the 
bartender who overserves a patron who then gets behind the 
wheel and causes an accident; or the social host who allows 
teens to throw a party with underage drinking at their home, 
and one of those teens tragically dies after overconsumption; 
or the healthcare provider who prescribes a sedative to an 
individual without proper warning, resulting in the 
individual using the drug, driving, and subsequently causing 
an accident.49 Texters are not passive third-party observers. 
Texters are third parties who engage in affirmative conduct 
that poses risk to innocent individuals.50  
 
Id. at 618. 
 47. Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 
(N.Y. 2001)). 
 48. See Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 272 (“[C]ourts are not free to decide what should 
be founded in statutory authority. This is the realm of the legislature. Simply 
put, if the legislature wishes to make actionable a third party’s texting to a 
motorist, notwithstanding their lack of knowledge that the person to whom they 
are texting is driving, they should do so. This Court refuses to establish this cause 
of action by judicial fiat.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Davis, 46 N.E.3d at 617; Rust v. Reyer, 693 N.E.2d 1074, 1076 
(N.Y. 1998); Place v. Cooper, 827 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 (App. Div. 2006); Carr v. 
Kaifler, 601 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (App. Div. 1993); Custen v. Salty Dog, Inc., 566 
N.Y.S.2d 348, 348 (App. Div. 1991); Montgomery v. Orr, 498 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970–
71 (Sup. Ct. 1986). 
 50. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559, 572–73 (Mass. 2019). On 
2020] TEXTERS AS CO-CREATORS OF RISK 721 
IV. SENDER LIABILITY: ROOTED IN WELL-ESTABLISHED DUTY 
PRINCIPLES 
A. Social Host Liability 
New York State recognizes social host liability.51 Even in 
circumstances where injury occurs off premises, New York 
typically finds liability under common-law negligence.52 In 
cases of social host liability, a court may hold a host liable for 
harm caused by guests to third parties where the furnishing 
of alcohol is the proximate cause of injury.53 However, New 
 
appeal, the defendant argued she did not inflict serious bodily harm on the victim. 
The defendant contended “infliction” required direct, physical causation of harm, 
not mere proximate causation, and that from her remote location, she could not 
have inflicted serious bodily harm on the victim under the relevant statute. The 
court held defendant’s argument was an “unduly narrow” interpretation and that 
by its terms, the statute required the offense involve the infliction of serious 
bodily harm, not that the defendant herself be the one who directly inflicted it. 
The court stated, “[i]f we were to interpret the statute to include such a 
requirement, it is difficult to see how a [suspect] could be indicted as a[n] . . . 
offender for, say, hiring a third party to carry out an attack on a victim.” It is 
enough, the court continued, “that involuntary manslaughter in these 
circumstances inherently involves the infliction of serious bodily harm.” Further, 
the court held the defendant was reckless in her actions stating, “based on her 
own knowledge of the danger to the victim and on her choice to run the risk that 
he would comply with her instruction to get back into the truck.” Id. at 573. 
Ultimately, the court held the defendant was reckless in her conduct of texting 
the victim because she knew of the danger of her conduct toward the victim and 
chose to run the risk that the victim would comply. Recognition of sender liability 
falls in line with the court’s reasoning in Carter. Where a texter recklessly texts 
a driver knowing the danger of their conduct and that the driver is likely to 
answer the text, the texter runs the risk that the victim will answer. There is no 
reason to find direct, physical causation of harm, rather, the infliction of serious 
bodily harm, even from a remote location is enough. See id. at 574. 
 51. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 11-100, 11-101 (McKinney 2010); Rust, 693 
N.E.2d at 1076–77; Montgomery, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 972. 
 52. See Montgomery, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 972. 
 53. See Jennifer Edelson, “ETA?” Estimated Time of Arrival: An Analysis of 
New Jersey’s Remote Texting Liability, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1939, 1956 (2016) 
(“Perhaps the most analogous form of imputed liability to remote texting is social 
host liability.”); Social Host Liability, THOMSON REUTERS: FINDLAW, https://injury 
.findlaw.com/accident-injury-law/social-host-liability.html (last visited Nov. 26, 
2019) (“Most states have enacted laws holding party hosts liable for any alcohol-
related injuries that occur as a result of providing alcohol to minors. This includes 
injuries to the minor as well as any other individuals whose injuries or death 
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York courts apply social host duty only in instances where 
injury occurs on the individual’s premises where a minor is 
furnished alcohol.54 
Oftentimes, injuries occur off premises after an 
individual furnishes alcohol to a minor.55 In these cases, New 
York courts have applied common-law negligence to reach 
the third-party individual who furnished alcohol.56 Given 
this gap in legislation, common-law negligence implicates a 
person who is not physically present at the place and time of 
the event that gives rise to the cause of action.57 Applying the 
common law in this manner, New York courts have 
interpreted third-party liability in a way similar to New 
Jersey’s sender liability.58 
In Montgomery v. Orr, the New York Supreme Court, 
Oneida County, held that a parent could be liable under 
common-law negligence because the parent allowed minors 
to consume alcohol at a graduation party, which resulted in 
a fatal car accident after one of the minors left the party.59 
Despite New York’s inability to recognize a cause of action 
against a social host for negligence of a guest that occurs 
away from the site, the court analyzed the issue under 
common-law negligence as well as a violation under N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 260.20.60 The court noted that its opinion 
 
resulted from the minor being provided with alcohol. Some states have more 
general social host liability laws, which are not limited to just minors but to 
anyone who was encouraged or allowed to drink excessively to the point where 
he or she was injured or killed, or caused another’s injury or death.”). 
 54. See GEN. OBLIG. § 11-100; Rust, 693 N.E.2d at 1077. 
 55. See, e.g., Rust, 693 N.E.2d at 1075; Montgomery, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 970. 
 56. See Rust, 693 N.E.2d at 1076–77; Montgomery, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 973. 
 57. Strider, supra note 29, at 1014 (discussing the expansion of common-law 
negligence principles to cover third parties in social host liability contexts). 
 58. See id. 
 59. 498 N.Y.S.2d at 972–74 (deciding the case under N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 260.20, but noting that, “[h]ad this accident occurred but some 118 days later, 
plaintiff’s cause of action would fall squarely within the provisions of [GEN. OBLIG. 
§ 11-100].”). 
 60. Id. at 972 (holding that a third party may bring an action in common-law 
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supported public policy notions, including a need to reduce 
underage drinking and the injuries that result.61 
New York courts have viewed social host liability and 
common-law negligence liberally in cases of underage 
drinking and resulting third-party injuries.62 In further 
expanding social host liability under public policy 
considerations, Rust v. Reyer held that N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 
§ 11-100 should be interpreted broadly, as to impose liability 
on social hosts who furnish alcoholic beverages to minors.63 
The court in Rust focused intently on the definition of 
“furnishing,” as used in the statute and expanded it by 
holding that the purpose of the statute was to employ civil 
penalties as a deterrent against underage drinking.64 Public 
policy directs courts to interpret the statute broadly as to 
deter underage drinking by imposing civil penalties to those 
who provide, supply, or give alcohol to an underage person.65 
 
negligence for injuries that are shown to be causally connected to a breach of 
§ 260.20(4)). 
 61. Id. (“Experience has shown that drinking by underage persons produces 
not only injurious consequences to the minor, but to others. This is especially so 
when you combine the drinking with driving. Recent state and national studies 
have shown a direct corollary between teenage drinking and the number of motor 
vehicle accidents and resulting injuries and deaths.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Rust v. Reyer, 693 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (N.Y. 1998); Montgomery, 
498 N.Y.S.2d at 974. 
 63. 693 N.E.2d at 1077 (holding that Reyer, a teen hosting a party at her 
parents’ house while they were out of town, could be liable as a social host under 
GEN. OBLIG. § 11-100). Reyer agreed to allow students from a fraternity to bring 
beer to a party and charge those who attended the party in exchange for a share 
of the profits. Id. at 1075. A fight ensued at the party and a guest was injured. 
Analyzing the facts under GEN. OBLIG. § 11-100 the court held that “[t]he facts 
alleged demonstrate that Reyer was more than an unknowing bystander or an 
innocent dupe whose premises were used by other minors seeking to drink” and 
“was more than a passive participant who merely knew of the underage drinking 
and did nothing else to encourage it. Reyer played an indispensable role in the 
scheme to make the alcohol available to the underage party guests.” Id. at 1077 
(internal citations omitted). 
 64. Id. at 1076–77. 
 65. Id. at 1077 (citing the purpose of the legislature in enacting GEN. OBLIG. 
§ 11-100 and comparing § 11-100 with Dram Shop laws). The court quoted the 
legislature stating that: 
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B. Distracted Driver and Passenger Liability 
A passenger has a duty not to distract a driver when the 
driver is operating the vehicle.66 Courts typically impose 
liability on passengers who breach this duty, either by 
holding that the passenger is contributorily liable, or 
completely liable for injuries to plaintiffs.67 In Collins v. 
McGinley, a passenger sued a driver who failed to stop at an 
intersection and collided with another vehicle.68 In its 
holding, the court considered evidence that the passenger 
distracted the driver and ultimately apportioned liability 
between both the passenger and the driver.69 In a more 
egregious case, the court in Good v. MacDonell held that the 
passenger, who tugged the steering wheel and caused the 
vehicle to collide with pedestrians, was liable for all of the 
injuries inflicted.70 
One of the first cases to decide manufacturer liability for 
distracted driving was Durkee v. Geologic Solutions, Inc.71 In 
Durkee, a truck driver was using an in-truck text messaging 
system and, while distracted with the system, collided with 
 
Over the years, numerous court cases have dealt extensively with the 
question of common law liability on the part of those who knowingly 
furnish alcoholic beverages to under-age persons at graduation parties, 
church socials, wedding receptions, office parties, and college campuses. 
Under-age persons consuming excess alcohol at these social events 
unquestionably have the same propensity to do harm to the traveling 
public as those who have been served alcohol pursuant to a sale. (1983 
N.Y. Legis. Ann., at 281). 
 66. See Collins v. McGinley, 558 N.Y.S.2d 979, 980 (App. Div. 1990); Good v. 
MacDonell, 564 N.Y.S.2d 949, 952 (Sup. Ct. 1990). 
 67. Collins, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 980. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 564 N.Y.S.2d at 953 (“The sudden yanking of the steering wheel by the 
defendant Garris without prior warning was clearly the sole proximate cause of 
the car striking the pedestrian and going out of control.”). 
 71. 502 F. App’x 326, 327 (4th Cir. 2013), aff’g Durkee v. C.H. Robinson 
Worldwide, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 742 (W.D.N.C. 2011). 
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vehicles that had stopped in front of him.72 The court held 
that “the accident was caused by the driver’s inattention, not 
the texting device itself, and that manufacturers are not 
required to design a product incapable of distracting a 
driver.”73 Since Durkee, many courts have considered the 
question of whether a technology manufacturer may be liable 
under theories of negligence, products liability, or both, for 
software that fails to “lock” a cellphone while a car is in 
motion.74 In 2010, an appellate court in Oklahoma held that 
“[t]he purchase and use of a cellular phone or cellular service 
are not inherently dangerous acts, nor is it foreseeable that 
the sale and subsequent use of such a phone would cause an 
accident.”75 In 2018, following a distracted driving accident 
in Texas that involved a driver using FaceTime, the issue 
was yet again whether a smartphone maker has a duty to 
prevent the use of an application that may distract drivers.76 
In Modisette, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth District 
held that Apple did not owe a duty of care to the parents of 
the deceased when a motorist who was using FaceTime while 
driving hit and killed their daughter.77 The court further 
held that the facts as presented lacked a showing of 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 327–28. 
 74. See Meador v. Apple Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 2649 (2019); Modisette v. Apple Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 213 (Ct. 
App. 2018); Estate of Doyle v. Sprint/Nextel Corp., 248 P.3d 947, 949 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2010). 
 75. Estate of Doyle, 248 P.3d at 951 (discussing negative public policy if the 
court imposed duty on the cellphone company). The court in Estate of Doyle stated 
that “[i]t is foreseeable to some extent that there will be drivers who eat, apply 
make up [sic], or look at a map while driving and that some of those drivers will 
be involved in car accidents because of the resulting distraction” but that “it 
would be unreasonable to find it sound public policy to impose a duty on the 
restaurant or cosmetic manufacturer or map designer to prevent such accidents.” 
Id. at 950–51 (quoting Williams v. Cingular Wireless, 809 N.E.2d 473, 478 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2004)). 
 76. See Modisette, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 213–14. 
 77. Id. at 213. 
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causation.78 
Meador was the most recent case to tackle the question 
of whether a technology manufacturer owes a duty to third-
party drivers because the software fails to “warn” drivers or 
“lock” the device.79 Although the court refused to find that 
the iPhone 5 or its software was a cause in fact of the injuries 
alleged, the court did not do so directly.80 Given the Fifth 
Circuit did not directly reject the plaintiff’s arguments, but 
rather declined to decide an issue that the state had yet to 
speak directly on, it seems that this issue will continue to 
permeate the courts as technology continues to evolve and 
consume all aspects of daily life.81 
C. Healthcare Provider Third-Party Duty 
New York courts have found third-party duty where a 
healthcare provider failed to provide a patient sufficient 
instruction upon discharge. In Davis v. South Nassau 
Communities Hospital, the New York State Court of Appeals 
expanded the duty of care to third-party medical 
professionals and hospitals.82 In its holding, the court 
reasoned, “[a] critical consideration in determining whether 
a duty exists is whether ‘the defendant’s relationship with 
either the tortfeasor or the plaintiff places the defendant in 
the best position to protect against the risk of harm.’”83 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Meador, 911 F.3d at 263 (considering plaintiff’s claims that that receipt of 
a text message triggers in the recipient “an unconscious and automatic, 
neurobiological compulsion to engage in texting behavior,” and therefore, Apple 
failed to implement the patent on the iPhone 5 and failed to warn iPhone 5 users 
about the risks of distracted driving). 
 80. Id. at 267 (holding that under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), 
it was not for the court to decide whether “Texas law would regard a smartphone’s 
effect on a user as a substantial factor in the user’s tortious acts.”). 
 81. See id. 
 82. 46 N.E.3d 614, 624 (N.Y. 2015). 
 83. Id. at 618 (quoting Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 
1061 (N.Y. 2001)). 
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In its opinion, the court stated that taking the step of 
administering the medication without warning the patient 
about the disorienting effects of the drug was to create a 
danger that affected all motorists on the road.84 Further, the 
court noted that the healthcare provider was the only person 
that could have given the patient the proper warning of the 
negative effect of the drugs.85 Therefore, the court held the 
healthcare provider had a duty to warn the patient about the 
potential for the drug to impair her ability to safely operate 
an automobile.86 This does not differ from sender liability, 
where the texter is the only person that could refrain from 
sending their text to the driver and effectively negate the risk 
of the driver responding to the text while driving. 
D. Distinction from Sender Liability: Manufacturer Liability 
Although courts have yet to impose liability on 
technology manufacturers, they are less reluctant to consider 
imposing liability when an individual takes a foreseeable 
risk in sending a text message to a driver.87 Plaintiffs argue 
that a key difference between these circumstances is that in 
the context of an individual texting a driver, there is stronger 
evidence of foreseeability.88 Bearing in mind public policy, 
courts have been more liberal in considering finding liability 
where an individual takes a foreseeable risk when texting a 
driver, compared to a technology manufacturer failing to 
include software that “warns” all drivers or “locks” all phones 
 
 84. Id. at 622. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
 88. Compare id. at 1227 (“[I]f the sender knows that the recipient is both 
driving and will read the text immediately, then the sender has taken a 
foreseeable risk in sending a text at that time. The sender has knowingly engaged 
in distracting conduct, and it is not unfair also to hold the sender responsible for 
the distraction.”), with Estate of Doyle v. Sprint/Nextel Corp., 248 P.3d 947, 951 
(Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (“[N]or is it foreseeable that the sale and subsequent use 
of such a phone would cause an accident.”). 
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while a vehicle is in motion.89 
Evidence of foreseeability in accidents caused by 
distracted driving is essential, but not determinative of a 
third-party duty.90 The court in Modisette created an 
exception to the duty of care even in a circumstance where it 
found foreseeability.91 However, the Kubert court held that 
in circumstances where an individual takes a foreseeable 
risk and sends a text message to a driver, it is fair to hold 
this sender of a text message responsible for the 
distraction.92 The relationship between distracted driving, 
foreseeability, and duty is both complicated and 
controversial, creating an imperative issue for New York 
State to begin to consider.  
 
 89. See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227; Estate of Doyle, 248 P.3d at 950. 
 90. See Modisette v. Apple Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 220–21 (Ct. App. 2018). 
 91. Id. at 221 (holding that it was foreseeable that Apple’s design of the 
iPhone 6 which failed to incorporate lockout technology could result in a car 
accident, however, that such foreseeability did not result in the court recognizing 
a duty of care). 
 92. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227. 
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V. NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE’S RECOGNITION OF  
CO-CREATORS OF RISK: DRAM SHOP LAWS 
The New York State legislature has enacted laws to halt 
epidemics that offend public policy.93 The New York State 
legislature established the first DWI law in 1890, which was 
amended to mirror “modern” statutes in 1910.94 Over a half-
century later, New York passed chemical testing laws, which 
allowed prosecutors to use compulsory blood tests as 
evidence to prove alcohol in the bloodstream for liability 
under DWI laws.95 Most notably, however, is the legislature’s 
recognition of the driving-while-intoxicated epidemic 
through its enactment of the Dram Shop Act. First passed in 
1873, the legislature has amended and supplemented the 
Dram Shop Act frequently, but the fundamental foundation 
of imposing liability on a remote third party remains.96 
Common law does not impose liability on a bar owner 
who provides alcohol to a customer who later injures another 
due to his intoxication.97 In these circumstances, the courts 
historically held that the intoxicated customer was the 
proximate cause of his own inebriation and any injury that 
followed—whereas such injury to another was unforeseeable 
to the bar owner.98 
As a response to the driving-while-intoxicated epidemic, 
which results in hundreds of fatalities per year, the New 
 
 93. See Daniel Gross, Closing the Loophole: Shea’s Law and DWI Blood Draws 
in New York State Under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(4)(A)(1), 74 ALB. L. REV. 
951, 952–54 (2011). 
 94. Id. at 953. 
 95. Id. (suggesting that chemical testing legislation as well as New York’s 
“STOP DWI” campaign were moves by the legislature that “clearly expressed its 
interest in promoting the goal of public safety . . . .”). 
 96. See id. at 953–55. 
 97. See Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 18, 22 (N.Y. 1989) 
(holding that there was no common-law cause of action for persons injured 
because of their own voluntary intoxication). 
 98. See, e.g., D’Amico v. Christie, 518 N.E.2d 896, 898 (N.Y. 1987); Berkeley 
v. Arthur Park, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290, 293 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
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York State legislature enacted N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW  
§ 11-101 in 1963 and amended the law in 1980.99 This portion 
of New York’s Dram Shop law imposes liability on a party 
who sells alcohol to an intoxicated individual if that 
intoxicated individual injures another.100 Under the statute, 
the following three elements must be proved in order to find 
the party who sold the alcohol liable: (1) the seller unlawfully 
sold or procured alcohol for the intoxicant; (2) the seller sold 
the alcohol to the intoxicant when the intoxicant was visibly 
intoxicated; and (3) there exists a “reasonable connection” 
between the intoxication and the plaintiff’s injury.101 
The first element of the statute is that the seller 
unlawfully sold or procured alcohol for the intoxicant.102 
Courts have consistently interpreted that this element of the 
statute only applies in the context of commercial sales of 
alcohol.103 In Carr v. Kaifler and Custen v. Salty Dog, Inc., 
the courts held that a restaurant or bar’s custom of providing 
free alcoholic beverages to its employees during work shifts 
did not constitute a commercial sale and therefore, declined 
to impose Dram Shop liability.104 Further, in Place v. Cooper, 
a minor’s mother provided alcohol to her son and his friend 
and the court declined to impose Dram Shop liability because 
it was undisputed that the mother did not commercially sell 
alcohol to her son or his friend.105 Even when a court 
determines that a commercial sale exists, the plaintiff must 
prove that the sale of alcohol was directed to the individual 
who caused the injury to another in order for Dram Shop 
 
 99. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 11-100, 11-101 (McKinney 2010). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See generally id.; Sheehy, 541 N.E. 2d at 20. 
 102. GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101. 
 103. See, e.g., Place v. Cooper, 827 N.Y.S.2d 396, 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); 
Carr v. Kaifler, 601 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Custen v. Salty Dog, Inc., 
566 N.Y.S.2d 348, 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
 104. Carr, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 9; Custen, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 348. 
 105. Place, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 396 (establishing that liability under Dram Shop 
requires the commercial sale of alcohol). 
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liability to apply.106 In Sherman v. Robinson, the court held 
that a convenience store was not liable for an indirect sale 
because the purchaser was not intended to be the sole 
consumer of the alcohol.107 In its analysis, the court noted 
that the intoxicated individual must have been present 
during the sale, provided the money for the alcohol, or took 
possession of the alcohol once the sale was made in order to 
show a “direct sale.”108 
The second element of the Dram Shop Act requires that 
the sale of alcohol be made to an intoxicated individual.109 
This element limits the expansive liability the Dram Shop 
Act places on commercial sellers by requiring that the seller 
have a reasonable basis for knowing that the consumer was 
intoxicated at the time of sale.110 This imposes a 
foreseeability component because an individual who sells 
alcohol to an intoxicated person could reasonably foresee 
that the intoxicated individual could injure another.111 In 
Wolf v. Paxton-Farmer, the court held that evidence of an 
individual consuming one mixed beverage and a portion of 
another was insufficient to establish that the individual was 
intoxicated.112 This holding establishes that under the Dram 
Shop Act, there must be sufficient evidence to establish that 
the individual was visibly intoxicated. Demanding such, 
along with the third element requiring a “reasonable 
 
 106. Sherman v. Robinson, 606 N.E.2d 1365, 1368–69 (N.Y. 1992). 
 107. Id. (“Given the Legislature’s choice not to provide liability for the indirect 
sale in this case, we decline to expand the common law to impose such liability.” 
(quoting Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984))). The court commented on 
the legislature’s power, stating, “[i]n this State, ‘the very existence of a Dram 
Shop Act constitutes a substantial argument against expansion of the 
legislatively-mandated liability.’” Id. at 1369 (quoting D’Amico v. Christie, 518 
N.E.2d 896, 900 (N.Y. 1987)). 
 108. See id. at 1368–69 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 1367. 
 111. See Howard S. Shafer & Mika Mooney, A Refresher on New York Dram 
Shop Liability, 37 TORTS, INS. & COMP. L. SEC. J. 17, 17–18 (2008). 
 112. 803 N.Y.S.2d 468, 468 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
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connection” between the individual’s intoxication and the 
plaintiff’s injury, are essential to ensuring that the Dram 
Shop Act does not impose sweeping liability.113 Because the 
Dram Shop Act is a deviation from the common law, it is 
strictly applied only in cases where there is sufficient 
evidence to prove that the seller sold to a visibly intoxicated 
person.114 
The last element required by the Dram Shop Act to 
impose liability is the existence of a “reasonable connection” 
between the intoxication and the plaintiff’s injury.115 This 
requirement frames the legislation to apply only in cases 
where the selling of alcohol to an intoxicated person results 
in injury to another.116 One result of this requirement is that 
intoxicated persons may not recover under the Dram Shop 
Act if they injure themselves in their own intoxicated 
condition.117 In Searly v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., a 
minor consumed alcohol he obtained from a Wegmans 
grocery store and lost control of his vehicle, resulting in a car 
crash and subsequently, his death.118 The Appellate 
Division, Fourth Department held that the statute does not 
create a cause of action in favor of one injured as a result of 
his or her own intoxication and there is no common-law cause 
of action either.119 
New York State’s Dram Shop Act reflects the 
legislature’s intent to correct the ongoing driving while 
 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 11-100, 11-101 (McKinney 2010); Shafer & 
Mooney, supra note 111, at 19. 
 116. See GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101. 
 117. See id. 
 118. 807 N.Y.S.2d 768, 768 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
 119. See id. (“It is well settled that General Obligations Law §§ 11-100 and 11-
101 do not create a cause of action in favor of one injured as a result of his own 
intoxicated condition.”). 
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intoxicated epidemic.120 Imposing liability on remote third 
parties who play a material role in driving while intoxicated 
incidents, such as bar owners who serve intoxicated 
individuals, spreads liability and deters not only drinking 
while driving, but also serving individuals who are drinking 
while driving.121 
Critics of Dram Shop laws are concerned with the lack of 
personal responsibility imposed on individuals in cases 
where the courts hold third parties liable for serving visibly 
intoxicated persons.122 The argument follows that the person 
who overconsumes alcohol then decides to drive while 
intoxicated, resulting in injury to another, should bear the 
entire burden of their actions, including liability in 
lawsuits.123 Further, critics highlight that Dram Shop laws 
punish businesses that serve alcohol because these 
businesses must carry expensive liability insurance as well 
as fees associated with being sued over accidents caused by 
intoxicated patrons when sued under exceptions to their 
policies.124 It is argued that Dram Shop laws also punish 
 
 120. See GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101; Wolf v. Paxton-Farmer, 803 N.Y.S.2d 
468, 469 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Shafer & Mooney, supra note 111, at 19. 
 121. See GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101. 
 122. See Tobias v. Sports Club, 474 S.E.2d 450, 456 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (“In 
our view, a rule which allows an intoxicated individual to hold a tavern owner 
liable without regard to his own actions in continuing to consume alcohol 
promotes irresponsibility and rewards drunk driving.”); Estate of Kelly v. Falin, 
896 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Wash. 1995) (“Given a choice between a rule that fosters 
individual responsibility and one that forsakes personal accountability, we opt 
for personal agency over dependency and embrace individual autonomy over 
paternalism.”). 
 123. The Supreme Court of South Carolina in Tobias, 474 S.E.2d at 454 
addressed Dram Shop critics’ viewpoint which allowed intoxicated drivers to have 
a first party cause of action against tavern owners when injured in an accident, 
as established by Christiansen v. Campbell, 328 S.E.2d 351, 354 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1985). Tobias overturned Christiansen, limiting the protection of intoxicated 
individuals who drink and drive by establishing that alcohol control statutes do 
not create a first party cause of action for an intoxicated adult person, but that 
they do permit a third party action. 
 124. Mary M. French, Jim L. Kaput & William R. Wildman, Social Host 
Liability for the Negligence Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1058, 
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businesses by requiring refusal of service to patrons who 
appear visibly intoxicated, resulting in declining sales.125 
Dram Shop laws impose liability on remote third parties 
for serving alcohol to intoxicated persons.126 However, 
refusing service or evicting customers poses its own legal 
issues.127 Dram Shop laws require that those who serve 
alcohol refrain from serving visibly intoxicated customers, 
but improper refusal of service can lead to customer suits 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which restaurant 
and bar owners try to avoid at all costs.128 Furthermore, 
evicting an intoxicated individual who continues to order 
alcoholic beverages can pose issues because upon eviction 
from the premises, the intoxicated individual may choose to 
 
1120 (1985) (“Between approximately 1971 and 1979, for example, one California 
tavern owner’s premium climbed from $10,000 to $190,000. About one-third of 
California’s 25,000 tavern owners chose to risk liablity [sic] rather than pay the 
high premium.” (footnotes omitted)). Tort law aims to provide innocent victims 
compensatory justice in the event of a loss. Dram Shop laws seek to compensate 
injured persons, especially in situations where the injured person cannot be made 
whole from the automobile insurance of the intoxicated driver or the assets of the 
intoxicated driver. Further, tort law seeks to deter behavior that is injurious to 
others. An argument could be made that some establishments that do not carry 
sufficient insurance will not be punished effectively under Dram Shop laws and 
furthermore, the injured party will not be made whole if the establishment’s 
insurance is not sufficient or the establishment is able to file bankruptcy, become 
effectively judgment-proof, and then reopen under another name. Regardless, 
statistics prove the effectiveness of Dram Shop laws. Since the implementation 
of Dram Shop laws in the early 1980s, the number of drunk driving deaths has 
been cut in half. Further, the percentage of all traffic fatalities that are alcohol-
related has declined from about fifty-four percent in 1986 to about thirty-nine 
percent in 1997. The alcohol-induced fatality rate has continued to decline 
through 2013, from forty-four percent in 2004 to thirty-four percent in 2013. 
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., Alcohol-Impaired Driving (Dec. 2014), 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812102.pdf (reporting 2013 traffic safety 
facts). 
 125. See French, Kaput & Wildman, supra note 124, at 1121–22. 
 126. See GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101. 
 127. See Kramer v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 641 So. 2d 557, 570 (La. Ct. App. 1994); 
Dogan Gursoy, Christina G. Chi & Denney G. Rutherford, Alcohol-Service 
Liability: Consequences of Guest Intoxication, 30 INT’L J. HOSP. MGMT. 714, 716 
(2011). 
 128. See Gursoy et al., supra note 127, at 716. 
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drive—initiating the issue that Dram Shop laws seek to 
prevent.129 Dram Shop laws also incentivize commercial 
establishments that serve alcohol to invest in additional 
insurance to assist in potential future lawsuits under Dram 
Shop.130 The issues associated with Dram Shop laws, 
including improper refusal or eviction and increased 
insurance implications, result in critics concluding that 
Dram Shop laws are ineffective and ultimately aim to punish 
the wrong party.131 At the end of the day, individuals are 
responsible for their own negligence and many argue that 
Dram Shop laws simply place liability on a third party who 




 129. In Kramer, a motel allowed a high school party where underage attendees 
drank alcohol. After several complaints, the motel evicted all non-registered 
attendees. 641 So. 2d at 561. The plaintiff left in a vehicle driven by an attendee 
of the party. The attendee crashed his vehicle, resulting in serious injury to the 
plaintiff. The court held that the motel’s “actions of throwing out intoxicated 
under age teenagers onto the motoring public was the worse [sic] possible option 
the [motel] did exercise, after allowing them to get intoxicated there.” Id. at 570. 
 130. See generally GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101. 
 131. See Ivan Lovegren, Dram Shop Laws Penalize the Wrong People, THE 
DAILY NEBRASKAN, http://www.dailynebraskan.com/ivan-lovegren-dram-shop-
laws-penalize-the-wrong-people/article_4628022f-891e-5b0c-837e-7cd78dac827c 
.html (last updated Mar. 3, 2006) (discussing an initial jury award of $35 million 
against a liquor store in F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 
680 (Tex. 2005) while the drunk driver was not held civilly liable). 
 132. See id. 
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VI. WHEN JUDICIALLY CREATED LAW LAGS:  
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION 
The United States is comprised of approximately 326 
million people; however, there are 396 million cell phone 
service accounts.133 The United States Supreme Court has 
described cell phone usage in the U.S. as “such a pervasive 
and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from 
Mars might conclude they were an important feature of 
human anatomy.”134 Solidifying this sentiment, the 
Modisette court noted that “[i]t is not only foreseeable that 
millions of people will have their cell phones in their cars—
it is almost a certainty.”135 
Although New York courts could absolutely recognize 
sender liability without expanding the traditional concepts 
of duty, it may take many years for the right case to percolate 
through the system, giving the courts an opportunity to 
recognize sender liability. In the event the courts do not find 
the opportunity to recognize this basic concept of duty, the 
legislature should step in before more innocent people are 
injured or killed due to texting while driving. New York State 
has recognized the pervasive use of cellphones by drivers and 
the associated dangers.136 Section 1225(c) of New York 
State’s Vehicle and Traffic Law restricts drivers from holding 
a mobile telephone to the user’s ear, dialing or answering a 
mobile telephone, or reaching for a mobile telephone in a way 
that requires the driver to move to a position that is not a 
driving position.137 Recently, New York has become stricter 
with its distracted driving laws, where a violation of such 
results in five violation points and a fine.138 Reducing 
 
 133. Modisette v. Apple Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). 
 134. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014). 
 135. Modisette, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 222. 
 136. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1225(c) (McKinney 2013). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Cell Phone Use & Texting, N.Y. DEP’T MOTOR VEHICLES (last visited Feb. 
11, 2020), dmv.ny.gov/tickets/cell-phone-use-texting. 
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distracted driving has been an imperative initiative in New 
York, opening the doors for possible recognition of sender 
liability by the legislature.139 
A. The Development of Cellphone Software to Limit Use 
when Driving 
Following complaints of technology manufacturers’ 
failure to incorporate software that “warns” drivers or “locks” 
the phone from allowing distractions, many applications, or 
“apps,” have been developed to meet demands.140 Apps that 
block texting while driving include Cellcontrol, Live2Txt, 
and Drive Safe Mode.141 Cellcontrol includes a device, which 
the manufacturer installs under the dashboard of a car and 
blocks sending or receiving text messages while the vehicle 
is in motion.142 Both Cellcontrol and Drive Safe Mode will 
alert parents when the device is disabled or overridden.143 
Live2Txt is unique in that, when activated, the app alerts 
the sender of a text message with a message that the driver 
is unable to respond at the moment.144 These apps not only 
deter drivers from texting while driving, but apps such as 
Live2Txt also provide the sender of text messages with 
knowledge that the driver is unable to respond.145 The most 
extreme of these new technologies to deter distracted driving 
is ORIGOSafe, a device that, when installed, restricts the 
vehicle from starting until the phone is docked into the 
center console.146 Currently, it seems that particularly large 
 
 139. Kingsley Nwamah, Reasonable Mistakes of Law in the Digital Age 
Following Heien v. North Carolina, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 532, 547–48 (2017). 
 140. See Evan Shamoon, Best Apps to Block Texting While Driving, VERIZON 
WIRELESS, https://www.verizonwireless.com/articles/best-apps-to-block-texting-
while-driving/ (last updated Jan. 24, 2016). 
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 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. ORIGOSAFE DISTRACTED DRIVING SYSTEM, https://vehicletechstore.com/ 
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companies who are looking to reduce incidents of their 
drivers engaging in distracted driving have considered this 
technology in a limited capacity.147 These apps, software, and 
locking devices are novel technologies, but, as more 
statistical data is gathered, they may become more prevalent 
among licensed drivers. 
Courts have yet to impose the use of these types of 
applications or devices in cases where drivers caused 
accidents by texting and driving.148 However, it is 
conceivable that courts may order offenders to install 
interlock devices after charges associated with distracted 
driving in the future.149 Similar to those convicted of drunk 
driving being ordered to pay for, install, and maintain 
interlock equipment that disables the vehicle until a 
negative breathalyzer test is administered, courts may 
impose those convicted of distracted driving to submit to an 
interlock device that disables the vehicle until a cellphone is 
docked and remains docked.150 Although courts have not 
implemented this practice, the Rhode Island legislature has 
considered this approach to deterring rates of repeat 
distracted-driving offenses.151 Unfortunately, given the 
courts’ reluctance to require recidivist distracted drivers to 
install interlock devices or software applications and the lack 
 
product/origosafe-distracted-driving-system/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2019). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Adam M. Gershowitz, Texting While Driving Meets the Fourth 
Amendment: Deterring Both Texting and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 54 
ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 611 (2012) (“[T]here is no reason why states cannot require 
offenders convicted of texting while driving to use such devices, just as most 
states require drivers convicted of driving drunk to use alcohol ignition interlock 
devices.”). 
 149. See id. 
 150. It is conceivable that future courts may consider requiring distracted 
driving offenders to install an interlock device in their vehicles. Distracted 
driving is equally as dangerous as driving while intoxicated and courts are willing 
to require the installation of interlock devices to “reduce the dangers of recidivist 
drunk driving.” See id. 
 151. Id. (noting that the proposal has been at a standstill since being shelved 
after it was proposed during a committee hearing). 
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of action on behalf of state legislatures, this innovative idea 
may not become a reality for years to come. 
B. Cellphone Software’s Insufficiency to Solve Texting and 
Driving Accidents 
Although innovative, technology, software, and apps 
developed to deter texting while driving have been less than 
effective overall.152 Products such as Live2Txt are making 
steps in the right direction; however, they still allow the 
driver’s phone to receive a text message, causing the phone 
to notify the driver of the message.153 Phone companies are 
not willing to disable phones, as the technology can be 
unreliable, resulting in passengers’ phones being disabled 
while in a moving vehicle.154 Even if manufacturers could 
improve the technology to disable drivers’ phones, companies 
remain hesitant to control their customers, who pay the 
service to “communicate on the go.”155 Without technology 
manufacturers such as Apple and Samsung deploying 
message-blocking software, parties continue to seek other 
avenues of relief through imposing liability on third parties. 
C. Dram Shop Law as a Blueprint for Sender Liability 
Sender liability seeks to impose a duty on third parties 
who are not in the vehicle but who text a driver and which 
text distracts the driver, resulting in the driver causing an 
 
 152. See Matt Richtel, Phone Makers Could Cut off Drivers. So Why Don’t 
They?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/25/ 
technology/phone-makers-could-cut-off-drivers-so-why-dont-they.html. 
 153. See generally id. 
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 155. Documents uncovered during a recent trial suggest that Apple has 
patented technology on software that would lock a driver’s phone. This software 
is able to detect if the phone is moving and if the driver is using the phone. 
Despite this, Richtel suggests that Apple has not deployed this technology 
because controlling its paying customers could have a negative effect on its 
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accident and injuring another.156 New York’s Dram Shop 
laws seek to impose a duty on third parties who are not at 
the site of an accident but who serve an intoxicated customer, 
resulting in an intoxicated driver causing an accident and 
injuring another.157 When defined side by side, sender 
liability and Dram Shop laws do not look significantly 
different.158 Both laws seek to curb an epidemic by placing 
liability on remote third parties, where their negligence 
contributed significantly to the resulting harm.159 Therefore, 
New York’s Dram Shop Act serves as an appropriate 
blueprint for the legislature to design a sender liability 
statute. 
1. Major Differences and Gaps in the Law 
Dram Shop laws and sender liability have a few 
conceptual similarities; however, this does not erase the fact 
that there are notable differences between the two types of 
third-party liability. There is no doubt that sender liability 
does not neatly fit into Dram Shop laws, as Dram Shop laws 
focus intently on commercial suppliers of alcohol, and the 
third party, namely, the seller of alcohol, has direct contact 
with the intoxicated individual prior to the accident.160 
 
 156. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
 157. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 11-100, 11-101 (McKinney 2010). 
 158. See LeBeau, supra note 7 (summarizing findings from a test designed to 
test reaction times when sober, when legally drunk at 0.08 blood alcohol content, 
when reading an e-mail, and when sending a text message). When unimpaired, 
the driver took .54 seconds to break and when legally drunk this added four feet 
to the location where the vehicle came to a full stop. Compare these numbers to 
the thirty-six feet added when reading an e-mail and seventy feet added when 
sending a text message. 
 159. See Meador v. Apple Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2018) (comparing 
technology manufacturer liability to Dram Shop laws). The court stated, “[t]o our 
minds, the closest analogy offered by Texas law is so-called dram shop liability: 
the liability of commercial purveyors of alcohol for the subsequent torts or 
injuries of the intoxicated customers they served.” Under that law, the court 
continued, “a person remains liable for her own negligent acts, but the 
incapacitating qualities of the product, which contribute to the person’s 
negligence, can subject the seller to liability as well.” Id. 
 160. GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101. 
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The first two elements of New York’s Dram Shop Act 
require that the seller unlawfully sold or procured alcohol for 
the intoxicant and that the seller sold the alcohol to the 
intoxicant when the intoxicant was visibly intoxicated.161 
Foundational to these requirements is a direct contact 
between the seller and intoxicated individual.162 This gives 
the seller an opportunity to view the intoxicated individual 
and to make a sound decision to refuse to continue to sell 
based on direct observation.163 On the other hand, sender 
liability implicates a third-party remote texter who may not 
have had any physical contact with the driver in days, weeks, 
or at all.164 This element of sender liability further removes 
the third-party texter from the driver, causing foreseeability 
concerns.165 
New York’s Dram Shop Act also requires that the seller 
be commercial.166 In Place, the court did not hold the mother 
liable for providing alcohol to the driver because liability 
under New York’s statute requires there to be a commercial 
sale of alcohol.167 Support for this requirement can be found 
in the holding of D’Amico v. Christie, a landmark New York 
decision in the context of Dram Shop law and 
interpretation.168 The D’Amico court held, “[t]hat the statute 
is properly limited to sellers of intoxicating liquors is made 
plain even by its title: ‘Compensation for injury caused by the 
illegal sale of intoxicating liquor.’”169 The body of the statute 
also speaks of “unlawfully selling” alcohol.170 This 
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 162. See id. 
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 164. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
 165. Id. at 1227. 
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requirement adds an element of responsibility to commercial 
establishments in particular, where employees are trained to 
identify intoxicated individuals, as opposed to a mere 
individual providing alcohol to another. 
2. Significant Similarities of Dram Shop Law and 
Sender Liability 
New York’s Dram Shop Act is not a perfect model for 
sender liability to copy verbatim. However, its similarities 
are prominently more significant than its differences. Few 
laws are perfect reiterations of one another, yet they can 
build upon each other and evolve current law to address 
contemporary epidemics.171 
First, Dram Shop laws have focused on imposing liability 
on third parties who are not present at the scene of the 
incident.172 Sender liability also seeks to impose liability on 
remote third-party “texters” who distract drivers, resulting 
in harm to another.173 A policy consideration for imposing 
this type of liability on third-party texters is a strategic move 
to marry moral duty with legal duty, resulting in liability for 
those who have control in sending a distracting text message, 
thus engaging in a reasonably foreseeable risk.174 A 
secondary policy comparison is that driving while intoxicated 
 
alcohol providers—as it did in 1983 in adding General Obligations Law § 11-100, 
applicable to minors—it said exactly that.”). 
 171. See Meador v. Apple Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 265–66 (5th Cir. 2018); Jordan 
Michael, Liability for Accidents From Use and Abuse of Cell Phones: When are 
Employers and Cell Phone Manufactures Liable?, 79 N.D. L. REV. 299, 299 
(2003) (indicating that approximately eighty-five percent of Americans who own 
cell phones use them while they are driving); LeBeau, supra note 7 (concluding 
that texting and driving is, on average, more dangerous than drinking and 
driving). 
 172. See generally N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 11-100, 11-101 (McKinney 2010). 
 173. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
 174. Morgan Gough, Judicial Messaging: Remove Texter Liability As Public 
Education, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 469, 483 (2015) (“Just as providing an insane 
person with a firearm, or continuing to serve alcohol to a patron who is likely to 
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a driver to text while driving.”). 
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and distracted driving are both trends that grew 
significantly over time, causing substantial injury and death, 
demanding legislative action.175 
Beyond policy considerations, there is clear statutory 
language that suggests Dram Shop laws provide an effective 
blueprint for the New York legislature to consider in 
enacting sender liability. In order to find liability under 
Dram Shop laws, one must prove that: (1) a commercial 
establishment sold alcohol to (2) a visibly intoxicated 
individual, and (3) such behavior resulted in injury to 
another.176 Likewise, the court in Kubert held that sender 
liability could only be found when, (1) a texter sends a 
message to (2) an individual they know or should know is 
driving and would be distracted by the message, and (3) such 
behavior resulted in injury to another.177 
The Kubert court structured sender liability around the 
full duty analysis presented in Desir, which includes 
considerations of the following four factors when imposing 
third-party liability: (1) the relationship of the parties, (2) the 
nature of the risk, (3) the ability to exercise care, and (4) 
public policy considerations.178 In sender liability cases, the 
parties typically know each other well, the texter knows that 
if the recipient receives a text message it will be distracting, 
refraining from texting is an easy and effective solution, and 
there are vast public policy arguments that urge drivers not 
to drive distracted and risk the innocent lives of others.179 
The relationship of the parties negates some of the 
criticisms regarding the ability to relate sender liability to 
 
 175. See Ogozalek, supra note 7 and accompanying text; LeBeau, supra note 7 
(concluding that reaction times are up to four times slower when checking an e-
mail or text message on your phone while driving than drivers who drive 
undistracted). 
 176. See GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101. 
 177. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1219. 
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Dram Shop laws. Although a texter may not have the same 
direct physical contact with the driver as does a bartender 
with an intoxicated consumer, texters and drivers tend to 
have an arguably closer personal relationship than any given 
intoxicated person has with a bartender. Most individuals 
frequently text their significant others, close friends, 
siblings, and parents. These people are close to the individual 
and typically know the individual’s habits such as whether 
or not they text and answer calls while driving, whether they 
allow more than three minutes to pass before sending a 
response, or whether they habitually leave their phone in the 
glovebox when they are in the car. This personal knowledge 
of the third party about the character, behavior, and habits 
of the driver is unique to third-party liability scenarios. 
Perhaps it is this strong personal knowledge and 
relationship that establishes a sufficient connection between 
the driver and third-party texter that makes it possible to 
hold the third party liable. Therefore, it follows that a texter 
sending a message to a driver who, due to a special, personal 
relationship, knows that the driver will be urged to 
immediately respond to the text message, can foresee that 
their behavior could reasonably cause a harm to the 
public.180 This special relationship and foreseeability is 
debatably much stronger than the relationship between a 
bartender and a random intoxicated customer. 
3. Considerations for a Sender Liability Statute in New 
York State 
Given that distracted driving continues to become a 
societal norm, New York State should proactively address 
this issue through sender liability legislation. Vega was the 
first and only opportunity that the New York courts had at 
analyzing and determining the merits of sender liability. 
Unfortunately, the facts of the case were weak, with evidence 
proving that Cratsley did not have knowledge, nor should she 
 
 180. See id. 
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have reasonably known that the decedent was driving.181 
Without a special relationship between the parties that 
would arguably prove that Cratsley knew the decedent was 
driving and that the text messages would provoke him in 
such a manner as to distract him from driving, the court did 
not have a fact pattern to work with to sufficiently consider 
sender liability.182 Given the lack of evidence, the case did 
not survive summary judgment.183 Notably, the court stated: 
This court is not ignorant of the many steps taken by not only 
this state, but others in the nation, to protect against motorists 
texting while driving. While that certainly is not the only issue 
presented for consideration, this court does not believe it is the 
province of a court to establish a precedent for want of a statute that 
otherwise has not been considered, let alone approved, by a 
legislative body. Though many would prefer a court simply to make 
law where either a legislative body or executive has failed to do so, 
this court does not believe that is its role. It is not the role of the 
judiciary to sit on high and promulgate what it believes should have 
been a policy determination made elsewhere. Instead, the courts 
have deferred to the wisdom, or absence of it, of the legislature in 
defining what is actionable and what is not.184 
The court’s language in Vega does not outright reject the 
concept and principles of sender liability.185 Rather, the court 
leaves the issue open for the New York State legislature to 
address.186 Although the courts could still recognize sender 
liability, as it is not a revolutionary expansion of duty, given 
the distracted driving epidemic in New York, the legislature 
should address the issue by creating law instead of waiting 
for more tragic accidents to occur. 
Sender liability is very structured and limited to quite 
specific situations.187 The New York State legislature could 
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create a sender liability statute that will deter the occurrence 
of texting while driving while not egregiously expanding 
third-party duty. In her article that suggests cell phones are 
a new form of “weapons of mass destruction,” Linda 
Fentiman notes that insurance companies address issues 
more swiftly when the companies themselves feel the “sting 
of large jury verdicts.”188 If the legislature enacted sender 
liability law, insurance companies would be likely to follow 
suit by revising structures to provide rewards to those in 
compliance.189 Fentiman suggests that insurance companies 
reward employers who enact company policies against 
distracted driving, individuals who take “safe driving” 
courses that speak to the dangers of distracted driving, or 
even provide incentives to drivers who install devices in their 
vehicles that disable the driver’s phone while the car is in 
motion.190 
Although critics argue that sender liability may cause a 
“slippery slope” for liability, realistically, this is unlikely to 
be the case.191 Enacting sender liability legislation would not 
negate the duty that drivers have to use reasonable care 
while driving, including not allowing distracting stimuli to 
interfere with their driving.192 Furthermore, sender liability 
implicitly requires a level of conscious awareness on behalf 
of the texter of the danger before the text is sent.193 This 
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knowledge requirement limits sender liability sufficiently.  
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VII.CONCLUSION 
A special relationship is formed when an individual texts 
another who is driving and they reasonably know that the 
driver will be distracted by the text message and encouraged 
to at least read and potentially respond.194 In this 
circumstance, the texter has a duty to act reasonably when 
the action they are about to make foreseeably creates a risk 
of harm to others.195 This traditional negligence concept 
appears in many third-party duty statutes, such as social 
host and Dram Shop liability.196 Using this concept to enact 
a sender liability statute would effectively deter distracted 
driving, especially in cases of texting and driving. 
The New York legislature enacted the Dram Shop Act in 
response to the epidemic of driving while intoxicated, which 
caused hundreds of fatalities per year.197 Today’s epidemic of 
distracted driving is analogous to that of the prevalence of 
drunk driving, which demanded attention from the 
legislature.198 New York’s Dram Shop Act provides a 
blueprint for potential sender liability law because it limits 
liability to those who have a special relationship with the 
driver, requires a knowledge component that the driver is a 
foreseeable risk to others, and imposes a causation 
requirement where the behavior of the third party was 
materially significant in causing the incident. Similarly, 
sender liability imposes liability on a third-party texter who 
has knowledge that the individual is driving and will be 
distracted by the text message and such distraction is 
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materially significant in causing an accident.199 
The New York State courts have not been allotted the 
opportunity to consider a case containing facts that would 
survive summary judgment and allow full sender liability 
analysis. Without this, as concluded by the Vega court, it is 
the role of the New York State legislature to step in and 
intervene in an epidemic that kills more than 3,000 people 
and injures almost 400,000 people in a year.200 Sender 
liability, if recognized by the New York legislature, will 
discourage dangerous conduct efficiently. The elements are 
difficult to meet, as it requires a remote texter with 
knowledge that the recipient is driving and will be distracted 
by the text.201 However, in the cases where it does apply, it 
will stop individuals from mindlessly distracting drivers who 
must take care while on the road, resulting in fewer 
accidents and ultimately, fewer deaths. If recognition of 
sender liability in New York saved even one life, it would be 
well worth the effort. 
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